Stepwise refinement is a crucial conceptual tool for system development, encouraging program construction via a number of separate correctness-preserving stages which ideally can be understood in isolation. A crucial conceptual component of security is an adversary's ignorance of concealed information. We suggest a novel method of combining these two ideas.
Introduction
Stepwise refinement is an idealised process whereby program-or system development is "considered as a sequence of design decisions concerning the decomposition of tasks into subtasks and of data into data structures" [2] . We say "idealised" because, as is well known, in practice it is almost never fully achieved: the realities of vague-and changing requirements, of efficiency etc. simply do not cooperate. Nevertheless as a principle to aspire to, a way of organising our thinking, its efficacy is universally recognised: it is an instance of separation of concerns.
A second impediment to refinement (beyond "reality" as above) is its scope. Refinement was originally formalised as a relation between sequential programs [3] , based on a state-to-state operational model, with a corresponding logic of Hoare-triples {Φ} S {Ψ} [4] or equivalently weakest preconditions wp.S.Ψ [5] . As a relation, it generates an algebra of (in-)equations between program fragments [6, 7] .
Thus a specification S1 is said to be refined by an implementation S2, written S1 S2, just when S2 preserves all logically expressible properties of S1. The scope of the refinement is determined by that expressivity: originally limited to sequential programs [3] , it has in the decades since been extended in many ways (e.g. concurrency, real-time and probability).
Security is our concern of scope here. The extension of refinement in this article is based on identifying and reasoning about an adversarial observer's "ignorance" of data we wish to keep secret, to be defined as his uncertainty about the parts of the program state he can't see. Thus we consider a program of known source-text, with its state partitioned into a "visible" part v and a "hidden" part h, and we ask 
For example, if the program is v:= 0, then what he can deduce afterwards about h is only what he knew beforehand; but if it is v:= h mod 2, then he has learned h's parity; and if it is v:= h then he has learned h's value exactly.
We assume initially (and uncontroversially) that the adversary has at least the abilities implied by (1) above, i.e. knowledge of v's values before/after execution and knowledge of the source code. We see below, however, that if we make certain reasonable, practical assumptions about refinement -which we shall justify-then surprisingly we are forced to assume as well that the adversary can see both program flow and visible variables' intermediate values: that is, there are increased adversarial capabilities wrt ignorance that accrue as a consequence of using refinement. 2 Thus refinement presents an increased security risk, a challenge for maintaining correctness: but it is so important, as a design tool, that the challenge is worth meeting.
The problem is in essence that classical refinement [3, [6] [7] [8] is indeed insecure in the sense that it does not preserve ignorance [9] . If we assume v, h both to have type T , then "choose v from T " is refinable into "set v to h" -as such it is simply a reduction of demonic nondeterminism. But that refinement, which we write v:∈ T v:= h, is called the "Refinement Paradox" (Sec. 7.3.2) precisely because it does not preserve ignorance: program v:∈ T tells us nothing about h, whereas v:= h tells us everything. To integrate refinement and security we must address this paradox at least.
Our first contribution is a collection of "refinement principles" that we claim any reasonable ignorance -refinement algebra [6, 7] must adhere to if it is to be practical. Because basic principles are necessarily subjective, we give a detailed argument to support our belief that they are important (Sec. 2).
Our second, and main contribution is to realise those principles: our initial construction for doing so includes a description of the adversary (Sec. 3), a state-based model incorporating the adversary's capabilities (Sec. 4.2), a small programming language ( Fig. 1 ) with its operational semantics over that model ( Fig. 2) 
and a thorough treatment of indicative examples (Figs. 3-5).
In support of our construction we give beforehand a detailed rationale for our design (Sec. 2), and an argument via abstraction that induces our model's features from that rationale by factoring it through Kripke structures (Sec. 4.1). Based on our construction we then give a logic for our proposed model (Sec. 6), a programming-logic based on that and the operational semantics (Secs. 7, 8) , and examples of derived algebraic techniques (Secs. 9,10).
Within the framework constructed as above we interpret refinement both operationally (Sec. 5.3) and logically (Secs. 7.2,8.1), which interpretations are shown to agree (again Sec. 7.2) and to satisfy the Principles (Sec. 8.4).
Ignorance-preserving refinement should be of great utility for developing zeroknowledge-or security-sensitive protocols (at least); and our final contribution (Sec. 11) is an example, a detailed refinement-based development of Rivest's Oblivious Transfer Protocol [10] .
Refinement Principles: desiderata for practicality
The general theme of the five refinement principles we now present is that local modifications of a program should require only local checking (plus if necessary accumulation of declarative context hierarchically): any wholesale search of the entire source code must be rejected out of hand.
RP0 Refinement is monotonic -If one program fragment is shown in isolation
to refine another, then the refinement continues to hold in any context: robustness of local reasoning is of paramount importance for scaling up. RP1 All classical "visible-variable only" refinements remain valid -It would be impractical to search the entire program (for hidden variables) in order to validate local reasoning (i.e. in which the hiddens elsewhere are not even mentioned). RP2 All classical "structural" refinements remain valid -Associativity of sequential composition, distribution of code into branches of a conditional etc. are refinements (actually equalities) that do not depend on the actual code fragments affected: they are structurally valid, acting en bloc. It would be impractical to have to trawl through their interiors (including e.g. procedure calls) to validate such familiar rearrangements. (Indeed, the procedures' interiors might by unavailable due to modularisation.) RP3 Some classical "explicit-hidden" refinements become invalid -This is necessary because, for example, the Refinement Paradox is just such a refinement. Case-by-case reasoning must be justified by a model and a compatible logic. RT Referential transparency -If two expressions are equal (in a declarative context) then they may be exchanged (in that context) without affecting the meaning of the program. This is a crucial component of any mathematical theory with equality.
Description of the adversary: gedanken experiments
We initially assume minimal, "weak" capabilities (1) of our adversary, but show via gedanken experiments based on our Principles (Sec. 2) that if we allow refinement then we must assume the "strong" capabilities defined below.
The weak adversary in fact has perfect recall
We ask Does program v:= h; v:= 0 reveal h to the weak adversary? According to our principles above, it must; we reason whence we conclude that, since the implementation (v:= h) fails to conceal h, so must the specification (v:= h; v:= 0; v:∈ T ) have failed to do so. Our model must therefore have perfect recall [11] , because escape of h into v is not "erased" by the v-overwriting v:= 0. That is what allows h to be "copied" by the final v:∈ T . 
and we see that we can, by refinement, introduce a statement that reveals h explicitly. Our model must therefore allow the adversary to observe the program flow, because that is the only way operationally he could have discovered h in this case. Similar reasoning shows that if E then skip else skip fi reveals the Boolean value E.
The strong adversary: a summary
In view of the above, we accept that our of-necessity strong adversary must be treated as if he knows at any time what program steps have occurred and what the visible variables' values were after each one.
Concerning program flow, we note the distinction between composite nondeterminism, written e.g. as h:= 0 h:= 1 and acting between syntactic atoms (or larger structures), and atomic nondeterminism, written e.g. as h:∈ {0, 1} and acting within atoms:
• in the composite case, afterwards the adversary knows which of atoms h:= 0 or h:= 1 was executed, and thus knows the value of h too; yet • in the atomic case, afterwards he knows only that the effect was to set h to 0 or to 1, and thus knows only that h∈{0, 1}.
Thus h:= 0 h:= 1 and h:∈ {0, 1} are different. (Regularity of syntax however allows v:= 0 v:= 1 and v:∈ {0, 1} as well; but since v is visible, there is no semantic difference between those latter two fragments.)
A Kripke-based security model for sequential programs
Perfect recall and program flow suggest the Logic of Knowledge and its Kripke models as a suitable conceptual basis for what we want to achieve.
The seminal work on formal logic for knowledge is Hintikka's [12] , who used Kripke's possible-worlds semantics for the model: he revived the discussion on a subject which had been a topic of interest for philosophers for millennia. It was first related to multi-agent computing by Halpern and Moses [13] , and much work by many other researchers followed. Fagin et al. summarise the field in their definitive introduction [14] .
The standard model for knowledge-based reasoning [12] [13] [14] is based on possible "runs" of a system and participating agents' ignorance of how the runs have interleaved: although each agent knows the (totality of) the possible runs, a sort of "static" knowledge, he does not have direct "dynamic" knowledge of which run has been taken on any particular occasion. Thus he knows a fact in a given global state (of an actual run) iff that fact holds in all possible global states (allowed by other runs) that have the same local state as his.
For our purposes we severely specialise this view in three ways. The first is that we consider only sequential programs, with explicit demonic choice. As usual, such choice can represent both abstraction, that is freedom of an implementor to choose among alternatives (possible refinements), and ignorance, that is not knowing which environmental factors might influence run-time decisions.
Secondly, we consider only one agent: this is our adversary, whose local state is our system's visible part and who is is trying to learn about (what is for him) the non-local, hidden part.
Finally, we emphasise ignorance rather than knowledge (its dual).
The model as a Kripke structure
We assume a sequential program text, including a notion of atomicity: unless stated otherwise, each syntactic atom changes the program counter when it is executed; semantically, an atom is simply a relation between initial and final states. Demonic choice is either a (non-atomic) choice between two program fragments, thus S1 S2, or an (atomic) selection of a variable's new value from some set, thus x:∈ X. For simplicity we suppose we have just two (anonymously typed) variables, the visible v and the hidden h.
The global state of the system comprises both v, h variables' current and all previous values, sequences v, h, and a history-sequence p of the program counter; from Sec. 3 we assume the adversary can see v, p but not h. For example, even after S1; (S2 S3); S4 has completed he can use p to "remember" which of S2 or S3 was executed earlier, and he can use v to recall the visible variables' values after whichever it was.
The possible runs of a system S are all sequences of global states that could be produced by the successive execution of atomic steps from some initial v 0 , h 0 , a tree structure with branching derived from demonic choice (both and :∈ ).
If the current state is (v, h, p), then the set of possible states associated with it is the set of all (other) triples (v, h 1 , p) that S could (also) have produced from v 0 , h 0 . We write (v, h, p) ∼ (v, h 1 , p) for this (equivalence) relation of accessibility, which depends on S, v 0 , h 0 .
An operational model abstracted from the Kripke structure
Because of our very limited use of the Kripke structure, we can take a brutal abstraction of it: programs cannot refer to the full run-sequences directly; what they can refer to is just the current values of v, h, and that is all we need keep of them in the abstraction.
For the accessibililty relation we introduce a "shadow" variable H, set-valued, which records the possible values of h in all (other) runs that the adversary considers ∼-equivalent to (cannot distinguish from) this one; the abstraction
From sequences v, h, p we retain only final values v, h and the induced H. We now use our model to give an ignorance-sensitive operational interpretation of a simple sequential programming language including nondeterminism. To begin with, we continue to assume a state space with just two variables, the visible v and the hidden h. (In general of course there can be many visibles and hiddens.) Our semantics adds a third variable H called the shadow of the hidden variable h. The semantics will ensure that, in the sense of Sec. 4.2 above, the shadow H "knows" the set of values that h has potentially.
Syntax and semantics
The syntax of our example programming language is given in Fig. 1 . 4 Read the last as "vary h such that (v, h , p) ∼ (v, h, p) and take last.h for each". 5 In fact the H-component makes h redundant -i.e. we can make do with just (v, H)-but this extra "compression" would complicate the presentation subsequently.
The operational semantics is given in Fig. 2 , for which we provide the following commentary. In summary, we convert "ignorance-sensitive" (that is v, h-) programs to "ordinary" (that is v, h, H-) programs and then rely on the conventional relational semantics for those. 6 We comment on each case in turn.
• The identity skip changes no variables, hence has no effect.
• Assigning to a visible "shrinks" the shadow to just those values still consistent with the value the visible reveals: the adversary, knowing the outcome and the program code, concludes that the other values are no longer possible. Choosing a visible is a generalisation of that.
• Assigning to a hidden sets the shadow to all values that could have resulted from the current shadow; again, choosing a hidden is a generalisation.
• Demonic choice and sequential composition retain their usual definitions.
Note in particular that the former induces nondeterminism in the shadow H as well.
• The conditional shrinks the shadow on each branch to just those values consistent with being on that branch, thus representing the adversary's observing which branch was taken.
Examples of informal-and operational semantics
In Fig. 3 we give informal descriptions of the effects of a number of small program fragments; then in Fig. 4 we apply the semantics above to give the actual translations, showing how they support the informal descriptions.
We begin by noting that h:∈ {0, 1}, the simplest example (Fig. 3(.2) ) of ignorance, leads us as usual to either of two states, one with h=0 and the other with h=1; but since the choice is atomic an adversary cannot tell which of those two states it is. This is reflected in the induced assignment of {0, 1} to the shadow H, on both branches, shown in the corresponding semantics (4.2).
In contrast, although the program h:= 0 h:= 1 (3.3) again leads unpredictably to h=0 or h=1, in both cases the semantics (4.3) shows that we have H={h} finally, reflecting that the non-atomic program flow has revealed h's value implicitly to the adversary. Thus an operational indication of (degrees of) ignorance is the size of H: the bigger it is, the less is known; and that is what distinguishes these two examples.
For an ignorance-sensitive program S we write [[S]] for its conversion into the shadowed form. In this simplified presentation we suppose only single variables v, h (ranging over a set D, say), so that the shadow H is simply a set of the potential values for h (thus ranging over the powerset PD).
On the right the classical semantics applies: in particular, use of :∈ merely indicates an ordinary nondeterministic choice from the set given. Variable e is fresh, just used for the exposition.
Identity
[ 
We defer discussion of declarations and local variables until Sec. 5.4. 
Operational definition of ignorance-preserving refinement
Given two states (v 1 , h 1 , H 1 ) and (v 2 , h 2 , H 2 ) we say that the first is refined by the second just when they agree on their v, h-components and ignorance is only increased in the H-component: that is we define
We promote this to sets of (v, h, H)-states in the standard (Smyth powerdomain [15] ) style, saying that we have refinement between two sets S 1 , S 2 of states just when every state s 2 ∈S 2 is a refinement of some state s 1 ∈S 1 ; that is, we define
In each case we imagine that we are at the end of the program given, that the initial values were v 0 , h 0 , and that we are the adversary (so we write "we know" etc.)
Program Informal commentary 3.1 both v:∈ {0, 1} and v:= 0 v:= 1
We can see the value of v, either 0 or 1.We know h still has its initial value h 0 , though we cannot see it.
3.2 (one atomic statement) h:∈ {0, 1}
We know that h is either 0 or 1, but we don't know which; we see that v is v 0 .
(two atomic statements)
We know the value of h, because we know from the program flow which of atomic h:= 0 or h:= 1 was executed.
3.4 h:∈ {0, 1};
We don't know whether h is 0 or it is 1: even the -demon cannot see the hidden variable.
3.5 h:∈ {0, 1}; v:∈ {h, 1−h} Though the choice of v refers to h it reveals no information, since the statement is atomic.
3.6 h:∈ {0, 1};
Here h is revealed, because we know which of the two atomic assignments to v was executed.
3.7 h:∈ {0, 1, 2, 3};
We see v; we deduce h since we can see v:= h in the program text.
3.8 h:∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}; v:= h mod 2
We see v; from that either we deduce h is 0 or 2, or that h is 1 or 3.
3.9 h:∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}; v:= h mod 2; v:= 0
We see v is 0; but our deductions about h are as for 3.8, because we saw v's earlier value.
In 3.4 the " -demon" could be an adversarial scheduler, free at runtime to choose v:= 0 or v:= 1 -but it cannot use information about h to make that choice.
We have assumed throughout that v, h are of type {0, 1} so that, for example, in 3.5 the choice h:∈ {0, 1} reveals nothing.
Fig. 3. Examples of ignorance, informally interpreted
We promote this a second time, now to (v, h, H)-programs, using the standard pointwise-lifting for functions in which S1 S2 just when for some initial s the set of possible outcomes S 1 arising via S1 from that s is refined by the set of possible outcomes S 2 arising via S2 from that same s. Examples are given in Fig. 5 . The simplifications are made using classical semantics over v, h, H.
Fig. 4. Operational-semantics examples
The initial state is some (v 0 , h 0 , {h 0 }).
Program
Final states in the shadowed model
Thus this and 5.4 are equal.
5.6
h:∈ {0, 1};
But this one differs.
5.7
h:∈ {0, 1, 2, 3};
The final v:= 0 does not affect H.
In (5.9) the first assignment to v is unpredictably 0 or 1, revealing h's parity which indeed we did not know beforehand. Whichever occurs, however, that parity information remains even after the final assignment v:= 0, as shown by the H outcomes.
Based on the outcomes above, we have e.g. the strict refinements (5.3) (5.2), (5.6) (5.5) and ((5.7); v:= 0) (5.9). In summary, we have ignorance-sensitive refinement S1
S2 just when
Declarations and local variables
In the absence of procedure calls and recursion, we can treat multiple-variable programs over v 1 , · · · , v m ; h 1 , · · · h n , say, as operating over single tuple-valued
is actually a projection from the corresponding tuple; as the target of an assignment it induces a component-wise update of the tuple.
Within blocks, visible-and hidden local variables have separate declarations vis v and hid h respectively. Note that scope does not affect visibility: (even) a global hidden variable cannot be seen by the adversary; (even) a local visible variable can.
Brackets |[ · ]| (for brevity) or equivalently begin · end (in this section only, for clarity) introduce a local scope that initially extends either v or h, H as appropriate for the declarations the brackets introduce, and finally projects away the local variables as the scope is exited.
In the operational semantics for visibles this treatment is the usual one: thus
For hidden variables however we arrange for H to be implicitly extended by the declaration; thus we have
where D is the set over which our variables -the new h in this case-take their values (Fig. 2) , and we invent the notation H↓ for the projection of the product H×D back to H.
Modal assertion logic for the shadow model
We now introduce an assertion logic for reasoning over the model of the previous section. Our language will be first-order predicate formulae Φ, interpreted conventionally over the variables of the program, but augmented with a "knows" modal operator [14, 3.7 .2] so that KΦ holds in this state just when Φ itself holds in all (other) states the adversary considers compatible with this one. From our earlier discussion (Sec. 3) we understand the adversary's notion of compatibility to be, for a given program text, "having followed the same path through that text and having generated the same visible-variable values along the way"; from our abstraction (Sec. 4.2), we know we can determine that compatibility based on H alone.
The dual modality "possibly" is written PΦ and defined ¬K(¬Φ); and it is the modality we will use in practice, as it expresses ignorance directly. (Because KΦ seems more easily grasped, however, we explain both.)
Interpretation of modal formulae
We give the language function-(including constant-) and relation symbols as needed, among which we distinguish the (program-variable) symbols visibles in some set V and hiddens in H; as well there are the usual (logical) variables in L over which we allow ∀, ∃ quantification. The visibles, hiddens and variables are collectively the scalars
A structure comprises a non-empty domain D of values, together with functions and relations over it that interpret the function-and relation symbols mentioned above; within the structure we name the partial functions v, h that interpret visibles and hiddens respectively; we write their types V →D and H →D (where the "crossbar" indicates the potential partiality of the function).
A valuation is a partial function from scalars to D, thus typed X →D; one valuation w 1 can override another w so that for scalar x we have (w w 1 ).x is w 1 .x if w 1 is defined at x and is w.x otherwise. The valuation x →d is defined only at x, where it takes value d.
A state (v, h, H) comprises a visible-v, hidden-h and shadow-part H; the last, in P(H →D), is a set of valuations over hiddens only. 7 We require that h ∈ H.
We define truth of Φ at (v, h, H) under valuation w by induction in the usual style, writing (v, h, H), w |= Φ. Let t be the term-valuation built inductively from the valuation v h w. Then we have the following [14, pp. 79,81]:
We write just (v, h, H) |= Φ when w is empty, and |= Φ when (v, h, H) |= Φ for all v, h, H with h∈H, and we take advantage of the usual "syntactic sugar" for other operators (including P as ¬K¬). Thus for example we can show |= Φ ⇒ PΦ for all Φ, a fact which we use in Sec. 8.5. Similarly we can assume wlog that modalities are not nested, since we can remove nestings via the validity |= PΦ ≡ (∃c · [h\c]Φ ∧ P(h=c)). 
In fact Program 6.5 equals Program 6.4.
But Program 6.6 differs from Program 6.5.
· In 6.3 the invalidity is because might resolve to the right: then h=0 is impossible. · In 6.6 the invalidity is because :∈ might choose 1 and the subsequent choose v:= h, in which case v would be 1 and h=0 impossible. · In 6.8 the validity is weak: we know h cannot be 4; yet still its membership of {2, 4} is possible. The invalidity is because the assignment v:= h mod 2 reveals h's parity; the adversary cannot simultaneously consider both 1 and 2 to be possible. · In 6.9 the invalidity is due to the fact that v's value might have been 1 earlier; the assignment v:= 0 is an unsuccessful "cover up". 
Pre-conditions and postconditions
We say that {Φ} S {Ψ} just when any initial state (v, h, H) |= Φ must lead via S only to final states (v , h , H ) |= Ψ; typically Φ is called the precondition and Ψ is called the postcondition. 
Logical definition of ignorance-preserving refinement
We saw in Sec. 5.3 a definition of refinement given in terms of the model directly. When the model is linked to a programming logic we expect the earlier definition of refinement to be induced by the logic, so that S1 S2 just when all logically expressible properties of S1 are satisfied S2 also (Sec. 1). The key is of course "expressible."
Our expressible properties will be traditional Hoare-style triples, but over formulae whose truth is preserved by increase of ignorance: those in which all modalities K occur negatively, and all modalities P occur positively. We say that such occurrences of modalities are ignorant; and a formula is ignorant just when all its modalities are. Thus in program-logical terms we say that S1 S2 just when for all ignorant formulae Φ, Ψ we have that the property
We link these two definitions of refinement in the following lemma.
Lemma 1
The definitions of ignorance-sensitive refinement given in Sec. 5.3 and in (4) above are compatible.
Proof:
Fix S1 and S2 and assume for simplicity single variables v, h so that we can work with states (v, h, H) rather than valuations. (Working more generally with valuations, we would define H 1 ⊆H 2 to mean H 1 .x⊆H 2 .x for all hiddens x where both valuations are defined; the proof's extension to this case is conceptually straightforward but notationally cumbersome.) We argue the contrapositive, for a contradiction, in both directions. Suppose we have ignorant modal formulae Φ, Ψ so that
Because (we assume for a contradiction) S2 refines S1 operationally, we must have some ( 
But (since we assume logical refinement, for a contradiction) we have 
Two negative examples: excluded refinements
We now give two important examples of non-refinements: the first appears valid wrt ignorance, but is excluded classically; the second is the opposite, valid classically, but excluded wrt ignorance.
Postconditions refer to h even though the adversary cannot see it
We start with the observation that we do not have h:∈ {0, 1} ? h:∈ {0, 1, 2}, even though the ignorance increases and h cannot be observed by the adversary: operationally the refinement fails due to the outcome (·, 2, {0, 1, 2}) on the right for which there is no supporting triple (·, 2, ?) on the left; logically it fails because all left-hand outcomes satisfy h =2 but some right-hand outcomes do not.
The example illustrates the importance of direct references to h in our postconditions, even though h cannot be observed by the adversary: for otherwise the above refinement would after all go through logically. The reason it must not is that, if it did, we would by monotonicity of refinement (RP0 ) have to admit h:∈ {0, 1}; v:= h ? h:∈ {0, 1, 2}; v:= h as well, clearly false: the outcome v=2 is not possible on the left, excluding this refinement classically.
The Refinement Paradox
We recall that the Refinement Paradox [9] is an issue because classical refinement allows the "secure" v:∈ T to be refined to the "insecure" v:= h as an instance of reduction of demonic nondeterminism. We can now resolve it: it is excluded on ignorance grounds.
Operationally, we observe that v:∈ T v:= h because from (?,
Logically, we can prove (Fig. 9 below) that {P(h=C)} v:∈ T {P(h=C)} holds while {P(h=C)} v:= h {P(h=C)} does not. We now streamline this process by developing a weakest-precondition-style program logic on the (v, h)-level program text directly, consistent with the above but avoiding the need for translation to (v, h, H)-semantics. At (6) we give the induced (re-)formulation of refinement.
Weakest preconditions: a review
Given a postcondition Ψ and a program S there are likely to be many candidate preconditions Φ that will satisfy the Hoare-triple {Φ} S {Ψ}; because it is a property of Hoare-triples that if Φ 1 , Φ 2 are two such (for a given S, Ψ), then so is Φ 1 ∨Φ 2 (and this extends even to infinitely many), in fact there is a so-called weakest precondition which is the disjunction of them all: it is written wp.S.Ψ and, by definition, it has the property {Φ} S {Ψ} iff |= Φ ⇒ wp.S.Ψ .
Because the partially evaluated terms wp.S can be seen as functions from postconditions Ψ to preconditions Φ, those terms are sometimes called predicate transformers; and a systematic syntax-inductive definition of wp.S for every program S in some language is called predicate-transformer semantics.
We give it for our language in Fig. 8 ; it is consistent with the operational semantics of Fig. 2 .
Our predicate-transformer semantics for ignorance-sensitive programs is thus derived from the operational semantics and the interpretation in Sec. 6 of modal formulae. With it comes a wp-style definition of refinement S1 S2 iff |= wp.S1.Ψ ⇒ wp.S2.Ψ for all ignorant Ψ
which, directly from (5), is consistent with our other two definitions.
Predicate-transformer semantics for ignorance: approach
To derive a wp-semantics for the original (v, h)-space, we translate our modal (v, h)-formulae into equivalent classical formulae over (v, h, H), calculate the classical weakest preconditions for wrt the corresponding (v, h, H)-programs, and finally translate those back into modal formulae.
From Sec. 6 we can see that the modality PΦ corresponds to the classical formula (∃(h 1 , · · ·): H · Φ), where hidden variables h 1 , · · · are all those in scope; for a general formula Ψ we will write [[Ψ]] for the result of applying that translation to all modalities it contains; we continue to assume that modalities are not nested. We write wp for our new transformer semantics (over v, h), using wp in this section for the classical transformer-semantics (over v, h, H).
As an example of this procedure (recalling Fig. 6.8) we have the following:
Then the classical wp-semantics [5] is used over the explicit (v, h, H)-program fragments as follows in this example:
which, translated back into the modal P-form (i.e. "un-[[·]]'d") gives the weakest precondition h mod 2 = 0 ⇒ P(h∈{2, 4}).
Our general tool for the transformers will be the the familiar substitution [e\E] which replaces all occurrences of variable e by the term E, introducing α-conversion as necessary to avoid capture by quantifiers. There are some special points to note, however, if we are applying the substitution over a modal formula Φ and wish to be consistent with the way the substitution would actually be carried out over [[Φ] ].
(1) Substitution into a modality for a hidden variable has no effect; the substitution is simply discarded. Thus [h\E]PΦ is just PΦ. These effects are due to the fact that, although the modality P is implicitly a quantification over hidden variables, we have not listed variables after the "quantifier" as one normally would: so we cannot α-convert them if that is what is necessary to allow the substitution to go through. (This accounts for the stalling in Case 4 and is the price we pay for suppressing the clutter of H and its quantification.) Usually the body Φ of the modality can be manipulated until one of Cases 1-3 holds, and then the substitution goes through after all.
Example calculations of atomic commands' semantics
We now calculate the wp-semantics for Identity, Assign to visible and Choose hidden. Occurrences of v, h in the rules may be vectors of visible-or vectors of hidden variables, in which case substitutions such as [h\h ] apply throughout the vector. We continue to assume no nesting of modalities.
(v, h)-transformer semantics for skip
We must define wp in this case so that for all modal formulae Ψ we have
and that is clearly satisfied by the definition wp.skip.Ψ = Ψ.
(v, h)-transformer semantics for Assign to visible
Here we need
where the second equality comes from the operational-semantic definitions of Fig. 2 and classical wp. Note that we have three substitutions to perform in general.
The middle substitution [H\{h: H | e=E}] leads to the definition of what we will call a "technical transformer," Shrink Shadow, and it is a feature of our carrying H around without actually referring to it; in our v, h semantics we will write it [⇓ e=E], where the equality e=E expresses the constraint (the "shrinking") to be applied to the potential values for h as recorded in H.
The general [⇓ φ] is a simple substitution (too); but since it is a substitution for H it affects only the (translated) modal formulae, having no effect on classical atomic formulae (because they don't contain H). Thus for modal formulae (only) we have
Note that hidden variables in φ are not protected in Shrink Shadow from implicit capture by P.
Collecting this all together gives us wp.(v:= E).Ψ = [e\E][⇓ e=E][v\E]Ψ ,
which will be the definition we give in Fig. 8 below. We place the synthesised definition of Shrink Shadow in Fig. 7. Since Set Shadow is again a substitution for H it too affects only the (translated) modal formulae:
(v, h)-transformer semantics for Choose hidden
[
H\∪{E | h: H}][[PΦ]] = [H\∪{E | h: H}](∃h: H · Φ)
"translate"
= [H\∪{E | h: H}](∃h : H · Φ )
"let Φ be [h\h ]Φ for clarity"
= (∃h : ∪{E | h: H} · Φ )
"substitute"
Note that h's in E are not captured by the quantifier (∃h · · ·): rather they are implicitly captured by the modality P. Collecting this together gives us
wp.(h:∈ E).Ψ = (∀h: E · [h⇐E]Ψ)
which again will be the definition we give in Fig. 8 below. The synthesised definition of Set Shadow joins the other technical transformers in Fig. 7 .
Adherence to the principles
The wp-logic of Figs. 7,8 has the following significant features, some of which (1-4) bear directly on the principles we set out in Sec. 2, and some of which (5-7) are additional properties desirable in their own right. "Meta-" modality "M" stands for both K and P.
Substitute
[e\E] Replaces e by E, with alpha-conversion as necessary if distributing through ∀, ∃.
Distribution through M however is affected by the modalites' implicit quantification over hidden variables: if e is a hidden variable, then [e\E]MΦ is just MΦ; and if E contains hidden variables, the substitution does not distribute into MΦ at all (which therefore requires simplification by other means).
Shrink Shadow [⇓ E]
Distributes through all classical operators, with renaming; has no effect on classical atomic formulae.
We have [⇓ E]PΦ = P(E ∧ Φ) and [⇓ E]KΦ = K(E ⇒ Φ); in both cases, hidden variables in E are not renamed.
Set hidden [h←E]
Distributes through all operators, including M, with renaming as necessary to avoid capture by ∀, ∃ (but not M).
Replaces h by E.
Set Shadow [h⇐E]
For modal formulae [h⇐E]PΦ = P(∃h: E · Φ); and [h⇐E]KΦ = K(∀h: E · Φ);
note that h's in E (if any) are not captured by the introduced quantifier. (1) Refinement is monotonic -RP0.
In view of (6) this requires only a check of Figs. 7,8 for the transformers' monotonicity with respect to ⇒. (2) All visible-variable-only refinements remain valid -RP1.
Reference to Fig. 2 confirms that for any visible-only program fragment S its ignorance-sensitive conversion [[S]] has exactly the conventional effect on variable v and no effect on the shadow H (or indeed on h). (3) All structural refinements remains valid -RP2.
At this point we define structural to mean "involving only Demonic choice, Composition, Identity and right-hand distributive properties of Conditional." Such properties can be proved using the operational definitions in Fig. 2 , which in the first three cases above are exactly the same as their classical counterparts, merely distributing the relevant operator outwards: that is why their program-algebraic properties are the same.
In the fourth case, Conditional, distribution from the left is not considered structural as it requires inspection of the condition E; distribution 
Declare visible wp.(vis v).Ψ = (∀e · [v\e] Ψ)
Note that both these substitutions propagate within modalities in Ψ.
Declare hidden wp.(hid h).Ψ = (∀e · [h←e] Ψ)
Logical variable e is fresh.
The assign to visible rule has two components conceptually. The first is of course an assignment of E to v, although this is split into two sections [e\E] · · · [v\e] so that v's initial-and final values are distinguished in between, necessary should v occur in E. The second is the "collapse" of ignorance caused by E's value being revealed: the effect of this is inserted by [⇓ e=E], into the body of modalities. (if E then S1 else S2 fi); S = if E then (S1; S) else (S2; S) fi .
(4) Referential transparency remains valid -RT. The operational definitions show that effect of a program S, if classically interpreted over its variables v, h, is the same as the effect of [[S]] on those variables (i.e. ignoring H). Thus two v, h-expressions being equal carries over from S to [[S]]
, where we can appeal to classical referential transparency in the v, h, H semantics in order to replace equals by equals. (5) The ignorance-sensitive predicate transformers distribute conjunction, as classical transformers do [5] . Thus complicated postconditions can be treated piecewise. This can be seen by inspection of Fig. 8 .
wp.(v:∈ T ).(P(h=C))
≡ "Choose visible"
(∀e: T · P(e∈T ∧ h=C))) ≡ "h not free in e∈T "
(∀e: T · e∈T ∧ P(h=C)) ≡ P(h=C) "e not free in P(h=C)"
wp.(v:= h).(P(h=C))
≡ "Assign to visible"
"v not free; Shrink Shadow"
[e\h] P(e=h ∧ h=C)
≡ "h not free in e=C"
[e\h] (e=C ∧ P(h=C))
≡ h=C ∧ P(h=C) "e not free" ≡ h=C "|= Φ ⇒ PΦ"
We exploit that |= P(Φ ∧ Ψ) ≡ Φ ∧ PΨ when Φ contains no hidden variables.
The right-hand calculation shows that h=C is the weakest precondition Φ such that {Φ} v:= h {P(h=C)}, yet (v, h, H) |= P(h=C) ⇒ (h=C) for all C only when H = {h}. Thus, when the expression T contains no h, the fragment v:∈ T can be replaced by v:= h only if we know h already. From (5) we can treat each conjunct separately; from (6) we can use classical semantics on the non-modal ones. Thus the modal semantics is required only for the others. Fig. 9 uses weakest preconditions to support our earlier claim (Sec. 7.3.2) that the Refinement Paradox is resolved logically: if |= wp.S1.Ψ ⇒ wp.S2.Ψ, then from (5) we know {wp.S1.Ψ} S1 {Ψ} holds (perforce) but {wp.S1.Ψ} S2 {Ψ} does not -and that is the situation in Fig. 9 .
Example of wp-reasoning

Examples of further techniques
Beyond the general identities introduced above, a number of specific techniques are suggested by the examples and case studies that we address below. Here we introduce some of them, in preparation for the Encryption Lemma (Sec. 10) and the Oblivious Transfer Protocol (Sec. 11).
Explicit atomicity
If we know that only our initial and final states are observable, why must we assume a "strong" adversary, with perfect recall and access to program flow?
The answer is that if we do not make those assumptions then we cannot soundly develop our program by stepwise refinement. But if we are prepared to give up stepwise refinement in a portion of our program, then we can for that portion assume our adversary is "weak," seeing only initial and final values.
We formalise that via special brackets {{·}} whose interior will have a dual meaning: at run time, a weak adversary is assumed there (an advantage); but, at development time, refinement is not allowed there (a disadvantage). Thus it is a trade-off. Intuitively we say that {{S}} interprets S atomically even when S is compound: it cannot be internally observed; but neither can it be internally refined.
Thus for example {{h:= 0 h:= 1}} is equal to the atomic h:∈ {0, 1} -in the former, the atomicity brackets prevent an observer's using the program flow at runtime to determine the value of h, and so the {{·}}'d choice-point is not the security leak it would normally be. But the price we consequentially pay is that we are not allowed to use refinement there at development-time: for example, although the refinement (h:= 0 h:= 1) h:= 0 is trivial, nevertheless we cannot apply that refinement within the brackets {{·}} to conclude {{h:= 0 h:= 1}} ? {{h:= 0}} -and doing that is equivalent to asserting the falsehood h:∈ {0, 1} ? h:= 0.
(The lhs achieves postcondition P(h=1); the rhs does not.)
We do not give the formal definition of {{·}} here; 9 but we note several useful and reasonable properties of it.
Proposition 1 If program S is syntactically atomic then S = {{S}}.
2 Proposition 2 For all programs S we have S {{S}}. 2
Proposition 3
If either of the programs S1, S2 does not assign to any visible variable, or (more generally) program S1's final visibles are completely determined by its initial visibles, or program S2's initial visibles are completely determined by its final visibles, then {{S1; S2}} = {{S1}}; {{S2}}. 2
For Prop. 3, informally, we note that allowing intrusion at a semicolon is harmless when there's nothing (new) for the run-time attacker to see: for example, if S1 changes no visible variable, then any visible values revealed at the semicolon were known at the beginning of the whole statement already; if S2 does not, then they will be known at the end.
Referential transparency and classical reasoning
A classical use of referential transparency is to reason that
• A program fragment S1 say establishes some (classical) formula φ over the program state; • That φ implies the equality of two expressions E and F ; and that therefore • Expression E can be replaced by expression F in some fragment S2 that immediately follows S1.
The same holds true in our extended context, provided we realise that S1 must establish φ in all possible states: in effect we demand Kφ rather than just φ. In this section we check that this happens automatically, even when visibles and hiddens are mixed, and that thus the classical use of RT continues to apply.
Because Kφ is itself not ignorant, we use it negatively by appealing to "coercions": a coercion is written [Φ] for some formula Φ and is defined
The principal use of a coercion is to formalise the reasoning pattern above, i.e. the establishing of some φ in all potential states (by S1) and its use as a context for RT (in S2). We begin with using a coercion as a context. The only problem thus is removing a coercion that is not just [true] -and that is done by moving it forward through statements whose combined effect is to establish it, i.e. to "make" it true operationally: The importance of Lem. 4 is that its assumption |= φ ⇒ wp.S.ψ can usually be established by classical reasoning (recall Sec. 8 (6)). In the special case where φ and ψ are the same, we say that S preserves φ and, as a result, can think of "pushing [Kφ] to the left, through S " as being a refinement.
In summary, the above lemmas work together to provide the formal justification for carrying information from one part of a program to another, as in the following example. Suppose we have a linear fragment S; SS; x:= E where, informally, program S establishes some classical property φ, that property can be shown by classical reasoning to be preserved by SS, and it implies that E=F . Then to change E to F in the final statement, we would reason as follows: Thus the general pattern is to assume the property φ of the state necessary to replace E by F , and then to move it forward, preserved, through the program SS to a point S at which it can be shown to have been established. An example of this is given in Sec. 10(5).
We have thus checked that the "establish context, then use it" paradigm continues to operate in the normal way, even with mixed visibles and hiddens; therefore we will usually appeal to the above results only informally.
Hiding leads to refinement
We show that changing a variable from visible to hidden, leaving all else as it is, has the effect of a refinement: informally, that is because the nondeterminism has not been changed while the ignorance can only have increased. More precisely, we show that
for any program S(v) possibly containing references to variable v. This is a syntactic transformation, as we can see by comparing the two fragments
in the context of global hidden h ; they are both equivalent semantically to h := 0 h := 1 since the assignment to v is visible in each case. However, transforming visible v to hidden h gives respectively
which differ semantically: the lhs remains h := 0 h := 1, since the resolution of is visible (even though h itself is not); but the rhs is now h :∈ {0, 1}. Note that (9,rhs) is a refinement of (8,rhs) nevertheless, which is precisely what we seek to prove in general.
Lemma 5 If program S2 is obtained from program S1 by a syntactic transformation in which some local visible variable is changed to be hidden, then S1 S2.
Proof: Routine applications of definitions, as shown in Appendix A. 2
The Encryption Lemma
In this section we see our first substantial proof of refinement; and we prepare for our treatment of the OTP (Oblivious Transfer Protocol).
When a hidden secret is encrypted with a hidden key and the result published as a visible message, the intention is that adversaries ignorant of the key cannot use the message to deduce the secret, even if they know the encryption method. A special case of this occurs in the OTP, where a secret is encrypted (via exclusive-or) with a key (a hidden Boolean) and becomes a message (is published). We examine this simple situation in the ignorance logic.
Lemma 6
Let s: S be a secret, let k: K be a key, and let be an encryption method so that s k is the encryption of s. Then in a context including hid s we have the refinement
which expresses that publishing the encryption s k as a visible message m reveals nothing about the secret s, provided the key k is hidden and the following Key-Complete Condition is satisfied:
By s K we mean {s k | k: K}, that is the set formed by -ing the secret s with all possible keys in K. Informally KCC states that the set of possible encryptions is the same for all secrets -it is some fixed set M . "h now superfluous →(6) "
Our only assumption was the KCC at Step (3). 2
As a commentary on the proof steps we provide the following:
(1) This and the next step are classical, visible-only reasoning.
(2) The choice from M was visible; now it is hidden. (3) From s's membership of its type S and the KCC we thus know that s K and M are equal, whatever value the secret s might have, and so RT applies. This is the crucial condition, and it does not depend on M directly -all that is required is that there be such an M . (4) To justify this step in detail we introduce atomicity briefly, to simplify the reasoning; then we remove it again. We have h: Alternatively we could see it as an application of RT, in the spirit of the comment following Lem. 2.
(6) This is justified by the general equality
Deriving the Oblivious Transfer Protocol
Rivest's Oblivious Transfer Protocol is an example of ignorance preservation [10] .
13 From Rivest's description (paraphrased) the specification is as below; we use ⊕ for exclusive-or throughout.
Specification We assume that Alice has two messages m 0 , m 1 : B N , where we write B = {0, 1} for the Booleans as bits. The protocol is to ensure that Bob will obtain m c for his choice of c: B. But Alice is to have no idea which message Bob chose, and Bob is to learn nothing about Alice's other message m 1⊕c . The whole protocol is summarised in Fig. 10 .
Given that there are three principals, we have three potential points of view. We will take Bob's for this example, and the declarations of The classical correctness of the protocol is easily established by backwards reasoning through the equalities
What we must address here, however, is the more interesting question of to what extent the values m 0,1 and c might be "leaked". 
The types are unchanged but the visibility attributes are alteredà la Bob.
14
The significance of e.g. declaring m 0 to be global while r 0 is local is that local variables are exempted from refinement: a simple classical example in It is not a simple inversion, since the local variables f 0,1 and e, that is the messages passed between Alice and Bob, are visible to both principals.
the global context var g is the refinement
where the two fragments are in refinement (indeed both are equal to g:= g +1) in spite of the fact that the lhs does not allow manipulation of l 2 and the rhs does not implement l 1 := 1. Thus the variables we make local are those in which we have no interest wrt refinement.
Rather than prove directly that Rivest's protocol meets some logical pre/poststyle specification, instead
We use program algebra to manipulate a specification-as-program whose correctness is obvious.
In this case, the specification is just m:= m c , and we think it is obvious that it reveals nothing about m 1⊕c to Bob: indeed that variable is not even mentioned. 15 Under the declarations of (11), we will show it can be refined to the code of Fig. 10 , which is sufficient because (following Mantel [18] )
An implementation reached via ignorance-preserving refinement steps requires no further proof of ignorance-preservation.
An immediate benefit of such an approach is that we finess issues like "if it is known that m 0 =m 1 and Bob asks for m 0 , then he has learned m 1 -isn't that incorrect?" A pre/post-style direct proof of the implementation would require in the precondition an assertion that m 0 and m 1 were independent, were not related in any way, in order to conclude that nothing about m 1⊕c is revealed. But a refinement-algebraic approach does not require that: it is obvious from the specification the role that independence plays in the protocol, and the derivation respects that automatically and implicitly due to its semantic soundness.
We now give the derivation: in the style of Sec. 10, a commentary on the proof steps follows; in some cases arrows → in the left margin indicate a point of interest. Within Bob's context (11) , that is hid m 0 , m which concludes the derivation. Given our context (11), we have established that Rivest's protocol reveals no more about the (hidden) variables m 0 , m 1 than does the simple assignment m:= m c that was our specification.
A technical point is that our manipulation of r -introduced "late" then moved "early"-illustrates a feature which seems to be typical: although r's operational role in the protocol is early (it is used by Ted), its conceptual role is late: in order to manipulate the rhs of the assignment to it, we require facts established by the earlier part of the program. Once that is done, it can be moved into its proper operational place. Similarly, the statement m:= m c , from our specification, was carried through the whole derivation until the program text lying before it was sufficiently developed to justify via RT an equals-for-equals substitution in its rhs.
The commentary on the derivation is as follows: (7) The order in which the variables are introduced is not necessarily their final "execution order"; rather it is so that the right variables are in scope for subsequent steps. In this case our use of the encryption lemma refers to e, which thus must be introduced first. (8) The visible variable (m) is the 2N -bit pair f 0 , f 1 ; strictly speaking there should be a single variable f on which a subscript operation · i is defined, so that the syntax f i is actually an expression involving two separate variables f and i. Similarly, the key (k) is the 2N -bit pair r 0 , r 1 ; and the encryption operation ( ) is exclusive-or ⊕ between 2N -bit strings, which satisfies KCC. (9) The classical reasoning referred to shows that r d = f c ⊕ m at this point in the program, allowing an equals-for-equals substitution in the rhs of the assignment to r as described in Sec. 9.2. We could not introduce r:= r d directly in the previous step because that reasoning would not have been visible-only: the expression r d on the right refers to the hiddens r 0,1 . (See the comment (8) that f i is an abbreviation; the same is true of r and m.) (10) We have used the principle that (x:= E; y:= F ) = (y:= F ; x:= E), given the usual conditions that E contains no y and F no x, to shuffle the assignments around into their final order. (Recall (7) above for why they are out of order.) It holds even when some of the variables are hidden.
(11) The justification here is, as for (9) , that classical reasoning (as in Fig. 10 ) establishes an equality at this point operationally, that m c = f c ⊕ r, and then RT applies.
We conclude this example with some general comments on this style of development. The specification m:= m c of the OTP is unsatisfactory as a direct implementation only because the rhs mixes variables of Alice and Bob, two principals who are physically separated: we are following the convention that statements x A := E A , where the · A indicates "uses only variables located with Alice", describe computations that Alice undertakes on her own; on the other hand, statements x A := E B describes a message E B constructed by Bob and sent to Alice, received by her in x A . Thus the difficulty with direct use of the specification is that the expression m c is neither an E A nor an E B , and so there is no single "place" in which it can be evaluated. 
Contributions, inspirations, comparisons and conclusions
Our contribution is to have altered the rules for refinement of sequential programs, just enough, so that ignorance of hidden variables is preserved: we can still derive correct protocols (Sec. 11), but can no longer mistakenly propose incorrect ones (Sec. 7.3).
Thus we allow Stepwise Refinement (Sec. 1) to be used for the development of security-sensitive sequential programs, avoiding the usual "paradoxes" that in the past have attended this (Sec. 7.3.2). But we must then adopt a pessimistic stance in which we treat even a "weak" adversary as if he were a "strong" one: refinement comes at a price.
We argued that this price is "non-negotiable" in the sense that any reasonable definition of refinement must pay it (Sec. 3); but it can be mitigated somewhat by indicating explicitly any portions of the program in which we are prepared to forego the ability to refine: declaring them "atomic" (Sec. 9.1) protects them from adversarial intrusion (good), but also disallows Stepwise Refinement within them (bad).
Part of the inspiration for our approach was work by Van der Meyden, Engelhardt and Moses who earlier treated the OTP, and Chaum's Dining Cryptographers [17, 1] , via a refinement-calculus of knowledge and ignorance [19] . That approach (together with advice from them) is the direct inspiration for what is here.
Compared to the work of Halpern and O'Neill, who apply the Logic of Knowledge to secrecy [11] and anonymity [20] , ours is a very restricted special case: we allow just one agent; our (v, h, H) model allows only h to vary in the Kripke model [14] ; and our programs are not concurrent. What we add back -having specialised away so much-is reasoning in the wp-based assertional/sequential style, thus exploiting the specialisation to preserve traditional reasoning patterns where they can apply.
Comparison with non-interference [21] comes from regarding hidden variables as "high-security" and visible variables as "low-security", and concentrating on program semantics rather than e.g. extra syntactic annotations: thus we take the extensional view [22] of non-interference where security properties are deduced directly from the semantics of a program [23, . Recent examples of this include elegant work by Leino et al. [24] and Sabelfeld et al. [25] .
Again we have specialised severely -we do not consider lattices, nor loops (and thus possible divergence), nor concurrency, nor probability. However our "agenda" of Refinement, the Logic of Knowledge, and Program Algebra, has induced four interesting differences from the usual approaches:
(1) We do not prove "absolute" security of a program. Rather we show that it is no less secure than another; this is induced by our refinement agenda. After all, the OTP specification is not secure in the first place: it reveals one of Alice's messages to Bob. (To attempt to prove the OTP implementation absolutely secure is therefore pointless.) Thus there is similarity of aims with delimited information release approaches. In this example borrowed from Sabelfeld and Myers [26, Average salary] we suppose two hidden variables declared hid h 1 , h 2 whose sum we are allowed to release, but not their actual values. Our specifica-tion would be the "procedure-" or "method" call
that reveals that sum. The suggested attack is
which clearly reveals h 1 by using the parameters in an unexpected way. Indeed we have (Avg) (Avg-attack) -so we do not allow this either. Thus our approach to delimited security is to write a specification in which the partial release of information is allowed: refinement then ensures that no more than that is released in any implementation. (2) We concentrate on final-rather than initial hidden values. This is induced by the Kripke structure of the Logic of Knowledge approach (Sec. 4) , which models what other states are possible "now" (rather than "then").
The usual approach relates instead to hidden initial values, so that h:= 0 would be secure and v:= h; h:∈ T insecure; for us just the opposite holds. Nevertheless, we could achieve the same effect by operating on a local hidden copy, thrown away at the end of the block. T ; the refinement v:∈ T v:∈ R.v.h then expresses absolute security for the rhs with respect to h's initial (and final) value. We can then reason operationally, as follows. Fig. 2 shows that from initial v, h, H the possible outcomes on the left are (t, h, H) for all t: T , and that they are (t , h, {h : H | t ∈R.v.h}) on the right for all t : R.v.h. For refinement from that initial state we must therefore have t ∈R.v.h ⇒ t ∈T , which is just type-correctness; but also point, no matter what follows. The usual semantic approach allows instead a subsequent v:= 0 to "erase" the information leak.
Perfect recall is also a side-effect of (thread) concurrency [11] , [23, , but has different causes. We are concerned with ignorance-preservation during program development; the concurrency-induces-perfect-recall problem occurs during program execution. We commented on the link between the two in our discussion of atomicity (Sec. 9.1).
The "label creep" [23, II-E] caused by perfect recall, where the buildup of un-erasable leaks makes the program eventually useless, is mitigated because our knowledge of the current hidden values can decrease (via h:∈ T for example), even though knowledge of initial-(or even previous) values cannot. (5) We do not require "low-view determinism" [23, . This is induced by our explicit policy of retaining abstraction, and of determining exactly when we can "refine it away" and when we cannot. Roscoe and others instead require low-level behaviour to be deterministic [27] .
Our emphasis on refinement continues the spirit of Mantel's work [28, 18] , but is different in its framework. Like Bossi et al. [29] , Mantel takes an unwindingstyle approach [21] in which the focus is on events and their possible occurrences, with relations between possible traces that express what can or cannot be deduced, about a trace that includes high-security events, based on projections of it from which the high-security events have been erased.
We focus instead primarily on variables' values, and our interest in the traces is not intrinsic but rather is induced temporarily by the refinement principles and their consequences (Sec. 3). While traces feature in our underlying model (Sec. 4.1), we abstract almost completely from that (Sec. 4.2) into a variable (the Shadow variable H) which we can then "blend in" to a semiconventional program-logic formulation of correctness: thus our case-study example (Sec. 11) does not refer to traces at all. Nevertheless other authors' trace-style abstract criteria for refinement (i.e. preservation of properties), and ours, agree with each other and with the general literature of refinement and its issues [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 30] .
We conclude that ignorance refinement is able to handle examples of simple design, at least -even though their significance may be far from simple. Because wp-logic for ignorance retains most structural features of classical wp, we expect that loops and their invariants, divergence, and concurrency via e.g. action systems [31] could all be feasible extensions.
Adding probability via modal "expectation transformers" [30] is a longer-term goal, but will require a satisfactory treatment of conditional probabilities (the probabilistic version of Shrink Shadow ) in that context. Proof of Lem. 4 The proof is by structural induction over programs; we give the base cases here, using Ψ for a general (non-classical) ignorant postcondition formula. cases: when x is visible, it will be free in [⇓ e∈E]PΨ for any PΨ occurring (positively) within Φ; when it is hidden, however, it will be captured by the P-modality. Examination of the logical interpretation (Sec. 6) shows however that the former implies the latter, and this implication will propagate unchanged to the whole of Φ, since PΨ occurs positively within it. 
